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Introduction 
 
A ‘biopsychosocial’ approach to healthcare, as initially 
described by George Engel in his celebrated paper 
published within the journal Science [1], has been in 
common use for many decades. Contained in the term 
‘biopsychosocial’ is the assumption of an internal 
homogeneity between today’s different conceptual 
approaches to understanding individual persons as a unit 
and as complex dynamic wholes. In his initial publication, 
Engel outlined a preliminary, hypothetical framework and 
stated that a corresponding clinical model was needed. 
This still has not been achieved and currently this 
preliminary framework is erroneously understood as a 
model. Such a model requires the establishment of a basis 
for both science and humanities, a formidable task.  
In order to establish such a basis we used two methods 
in parallel. First, we introduced a formal logical notation 
that allows us to address those features of time that 
necessarily have to be taken into account in humanities, 
but are not extensively dealt with in sciences such as 
informatics, physics and biology. Second, with regard to 
the qualifying and specifying of the aspects of time, we 
referred back to human thinking at a time when science 
and humanities were not divided into two seemingly 
autonomous fields of study. We introduced the phrase 
‘dynamic coherence provider’ as a suggested 
contemporary term for being given or hypostasised as an 
underlying potential. Except for the indeterminableness of 
future, there is nothing mysterious about such a dynamic 
coherence provider: a motorbike is also one - as long as its 
screws hold tight so that proceeding occurrence (with its 
indeterminacy) can be expected. 
Then, on a non-stochastic level, we can differentiate 
between changes of states and something underlying that 
provides and ensures the internal coherence within these 
changes. One of the results of the underlying, provided 
coherence is that changes do not happen just once, but 
instead have the potential to be re-iterated. This in turn 
provides sequential coherence; that is a maintenance of an 
identity over a given period of observed time. Therefore, 
the way we can apply a formal concept of natural identity, 
that, while being compatible with scientific formalisation, 
also allows for topics that are commonly subsumed 
exclusively under philosophy, such as the uniqueness of a 
person, to be addressed.  
We are clearly opposed to Cartesian concepts, instead 
applying a potential-with-reality differentiation extensively 
studied in Aristotelian and scholastic philosophy. Its 
heuristic makes a clear distinction: whereas states and 
changes of states can be observed empirically by direct 
measurement, that which is said about a future and hence 
only a potential development, necessarily is and has the 
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form of, a hypothesis. Thus, the level of states and changes 
of states that have occurred and the level of changes of 
states that may, or may not, occur, must be dealt with 
differently. What is achieved by this differentiation is a 
more realistic, truly empirical, concept of time. Whereas 
such a distinction is in common use in research in a more 
implicit way, it plays a pivotal role in our approach. Here, 
different from the common approach, the underlying 
concept of time consists of a non-continuous, time and 
position-bound, specific and specifying character of time. 
As seen from ‘outside’, this type of time is encapsulated 
within the examined objects and as seen and lived from 
inside out, the latent, qualitative, temporal potential is, or 
may be, unfolded via its realisation manifestation. 
In a balance of the two foci, the level of already 
realised items and those that are only expected to happen, 
the approach allows spatiotemporal individuality to be 
better addressed. In applying the latter as a concept, we 
may understand a person as “an integrated, purposeful 
whole individual, rather than a disorganized set of reactive 
impulses” [2]. Whereas in the common objectifying 
approach to time a spatial metaphor is usually a good 
enough approximation, with time mapped as a fourth, 
seemingly continuous dimension in an approach that also 
takes subjectivity into account, then both the uniqueness of 
every moment and the uniqueness of every moment’s 
‘inside’ (in qualitative spatial and qualitative procedural, 
temporal terms) must be recognised. The present, unique 
moment, together with its still given potentiality 
concerning its next future, differentiates and qualifies a 
corresponding inside as being special and as not being the 
same as something on its outside.  
In also addressing what makes each individual a 
unique coherence and not only a bodily and mental 
coherence as given in objective, hence general terms, we 
conceptualise her or him also as the source of processes 
that start in her or him and that, via this fixed and 
maintained initiating position, have a unique, initially 
irreversible direction and a corresponding directedness 
towards the world outside and inside.  
For this not only descriptive, but also formal 
combination of the two different approaches, the one 
addressing objective aspects and the other subjective ones, 
we introduce a symbolisation for the aforementioned 
discreteness of inside-to-outside directed moments of time 
and their content. We call it ‘e’ in reference to the German 
word eigen and as employed in English words such as 
eigenvalue and eigenrhythm etc. It denotes something in its 
own right and hence an equivalent to an underlying source, 
given as a dynamic coherence provider, as discussed 
above. 
In differentiating between coherent realised changes of 
states on the one hand and their hypostasised source on the 
other, we can map serial or parallel changes of states 
together with these sources. This allows us to map and 
symbolise a subjective dynamic in addition. More 
generally, we introduce a symbol linking verified past and 
present states and their anticipated future to a parallel and 
sequential continuity, although the temporal aspect of these 
states has a discrete, discontinuous quality. The 
corresponding symbol, then, helps us keep in mind the 
temporal uniqueness of the states investigated, without 
preventing to construe and to conceptualise these states in 
the form of a pseudo-continuity. Metaphorically speaking, 
we encapsulate time in a symbol. This way, we open the 
way to a formalised description of the basis of parallel and 
serial coherence, together with the realisations of this 
basis.  
It is this basis of coherence that allows human beings 
to interact with their outside and inside world in a coherent 
and non-stochastic way. The fact that an underpinned 
coherence providing structure is the logical starting point 
of any encounter with the outside world causes an 
inevitable epistemic coherence bias. That is, as realised 
coherences, we tend to first interpret outside changes of 
states as being coherent also and underestimate the relative 
weight of stochastic changes. The suggestive, intriguing 
and seductive power of imaginary pseudo-coherences, as 
established in numerous holistic systems that hypostasise a 
primordial coherence of corresponding worlds, results 
from this bias.   
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In the three papers which follow we introduce the model 
step by step. To prove its applicability in both science and 
humanities, we use areas of study in both science and the 
humanities. Based on the combined objective and 
subjective perspectives, concepts such as salutogenesis and 
person-centered healthcare can be addressed in a formal 
and meaningful way. Our main concern was to formally 
map and to formally understand the interaction of psychic, 
also interpretative processes and bodily processes, as 
demonstrated for psychic stress and immediate, as well as 
delayed asthma reactions in children [3-5]. We welcome 
feedback on our approach. 
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